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Abstract
In this paper we introduce DML: Default Modal Logic. DML is a logic endowed with a two-place
modal connective that has the intended meaning of “If α, then normally β”. On top of providing
a well-defined tool for analyzing common default reasoning, DML allows nesting of the default
operator. We present a semantic framework in which many of the known default proof systems can
be naturally characterized, and prove soundness and completeness theorems for several such proof
systems.
Our semantics is a “neighborhood modal semantics”, and it allows for subjective defaults, that is,
defaults may vary among different worlds within the same model. The semantics has an appealing
intuitive interpretation and may be viewed as a set-theoretic generalization of the probabilistic
interpretations of default reasoning.
We show that our semantics is most general in the sense that any modal semantics that is sound for
some basic axioms for default reasoning is a special case of our semantics. Such a generality result
may serve to provide a semantical analysis of the relative strength of different proof systems and to
show the nonexistence of semantics with certain properties. Ó 2000 Published by Elsevier Science
B/V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Defaults may vary within time and space. A person who speaks both English and
Hebrew, who wants to know what is the time while walking in the streets of Tel-Aviv,
will address a stranger owning a watch in Hebrew, while when the same person faces a
similar situation in New York, he will certainly use English. A person may have different
defaults over time: In early 1993, we believed that a PLO member will strive to sabotage
the state of Israel. As of late 1993, this default does not hold. A limitation of most of the
systems developed so far for default reasoning is that they focus on a single reasoner in a
specific location.
There is no doubt that it is very important to be able to reason, sometimes by default,
about the defaults of other agents, and in particular, about our own defaults. If an agent is
trying to hide from the enemy, it should be useful for her to know what is the enemy’s
default strategy for searching suspects. In order to allow such a sophisticated form of
reasoning, we need a language for default reasoning that allows nesting of the default
operator. Most existing systems have none or very limited nesting capability.
Another issue is the pattern of reasoning adopted by most default reasoning systems
(e.g., [12,16,21,25]): It is assumed that a set of defaults and observations about the world
are given, and then from this piece of knowledge, the agent is supposed to draw plausible
conclusions. The problem with these approaches is that they do not give us any clue on
how defaults are generated in the first place. See [1,17] for further discussion of this issue.
In this paper we present a new logic for default reasoning that addresses the issues
and limitations mentioned above. The logic we present is a variation of modal logic, and
therefore we call it default modal logic (DML, in short).
Our semantics is quite simple and has a clear intuitive interpretation. Furthermore,
our semantics generalizes most of the known semantics for default implication. We
introduce an abstract notion of modal semantics (capturing all known modal type semantic
structures), and prove that any modal semantics of default entailment, that is sound for
some basic axioms for default reasoning, is isomorphic to a structure in our semantics.
Let us briefly present the main idea behind our semantics: Several semantics for default
implication interpret “If α then normally β” as ‘β holds in most of the worlds in which
α holds’. A natural example of this theme is Pearl’s System Z, [20], in which this notion
of ‘most of’ is defined probabilistically. We offer a general framework for this approach.
We adopt the set-theoretical definition of a filter as our formalization, for what the above
mentioned notion of majority might be. Probabilistic interpretations of ‘most of’, as well
as many other mathematical definitions of ‘large subsets’ are all special cases of filters.
Following an approach pioneered by Chellas [8] in the context of conditional logic, we
shall associate with each world w and each formula α a filter of subsets (of the modal
universe). We then say that “α normally implies β” holds in w iff the set of all worlds
satisfying β belongs to this filter.
Another feature of our semantics is that the resulting notion of default implication is
subjective; as we allow the filters to vary from one world to another, one world may
use a probabilistic interpretation while, another world in the same model, may assume an
‘accessibility’ (or ‘normality’) semantics, and a third world may use some type of weights
on its peer worlds to define its own interpretation of ‘most of’.
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The resulting semantics we get is surprisingly simple, and at the same time, extremely
flexible. We can easily define natural constraints to get subclasses of models that
characterize a wide variety of default logics.
Schlechta has given a weak filter semantics to defeasible inheritance [22] and to defaults
in a first-order setting [23]. His emphasis was not on modeling strong systems via filters
and coherence properties, but on modeling weak systems.
Independently of our work (but two years after the original publication of our work [3]),
Friedman and Halpern [11] have published the notion of qualitative plausibility measure
and showed that preferential structures and other semantic structures used for default
reasoning can be mapped into plausibility structures, and hence can be characterized by
the so called KLM axioms [12]. They define a “richness” condition, and show that any
semantics that can be mapped into a set of rich plausible structures will be complete for
the KLM axioms. They also explain how plausibility measures can be used for giving
semantics to propositional conditional logic, and observe that the expressive power of
conditional logic is needed in order to define semantics for default reasoning for which
the KLM system is not complete. Similar to us, Friedman and Halpern show how their
semantic structure can be tailored to represent different set of inference rules by using
different axioms for defining the semantic structure. Schlechta [24] has proved that the
semantics of Friedman and Halpern is equivalent to ours. Lehmann [13] has suggested a
generalization of Tarski’s monotonic deductive operations and showed that it characterizes
the family of operations defined by qualitative plausibility measures and by one of our
systems. We discuss plausibility structures in more detail in Section 4.
The paper is organized as follows. After discussing the basic ideas in the introduction,
we define the language and the simplest models of our logic in Sections 2 and 3. We then
show in Section 4 how we can add semantics rules in a modular fashion and get richer and
richer structures. In Section 4 we show that filter-based models are the most general modal
structures for modeling default reasoning, in Section 5 we discuss nesting of defaults, and
in Section 6 we add some concluding remarks. To enhance the readability of this paper, we
have moved most of the technical proofs to a separate section, Section 7, at the end of the
paper.
2. The language
We will first present the syntax of DML. We propose to add, to any given language, a
new binary modal operator 2−→. Intuitively, for any pair, α, β , of formulas, α 2−→ β means
“If α is true, then normally β is true”. For the sake of clarity we focus on the case where the
basic underlying language is propositional calculus. Most of the ideas and results below
may be easily extended to richer languages (in particular, to first-order logic). A formal
definition of the language is as follows:
Definition 2.1. Let V be a set of propositional variables. The set of all sentences in
the language of DML (denoted LDML) is defined as the closure of V under the usual
propositional connectives (∨,∧,¬,→) and the new binary connective 2−→.
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One should note that, as the operator 2−→ is introduced as a connective of the formal
language, our logic allows sentences in which this operator appears nested. We discuss the
implications of this extra power of the logic in Section 5.
3. The models
In this section we present our semantics. In the first subsection we introduce the basic
structures—the filter-based models. Then, in the following subsections, we show how, by
imposing various constraints on these models, they may be tailored to match a wide variety
of deduction systems. What we end up with is a sequence of semantics, all built around the
same theme, that are sound and complete for a corresponding sequence of proof systems.
Many of the common proof systems for default implication appear in this sequence. Most
of the names of axioms and systems that we use are taken from [12].
3.1. Filter-based models
Just like any other modal semantics, our models are based on a set of worlds, which
we call the universe. Each world in the universe represents a ‘possible state of affairs’,
i.e., it assigns a truth value to every formula of the language. The semantics of the new
operator 2−→ combines two basic ideas which already appear in the literature. The first
idea, taken from modal logic, is that each world has a collection of ‘relevant subsets’ of the
universe. A composite formula, say 2α, is defined to hold in a world w if the collection of
worlds satisfying α is one of the subsets relevant for w. Chellas [9, Chapter 7] calls these
models “minimal models”, while Bull and Segerberg call them “neighborhood frames” and
attribute their invention to Scott and Montague [6, Section 21]. Since here we are interested
in giving a meaning to a binary operator, each world in our model will have a collection of
relevant pairs of subsets of the universe. α 2−→ β will hold in a world w iff the pair—(The
set of all worlds satisfying α, The set of all worlds satisfying β)—is one of w’s relevant
pairs.
The second idea we employ mimics “conditioning” in probability theory. In order to
evaluate the truth value of a default statement “If α then normally β”, we focus on the set
of all worlds that satisfy α. The validity of this default implication is determined by the set
of worlds satisfying α and the set of worlds satisfying both α and β . Intuitively, α normally
implies β whenever a majority among the worlds satisfying α satisfy β as well.
The next question is then: Given a set of worlds, what subsets of this set can be viewed
as a majority? Many useful notions of majority in all areas of mathematics fall under
the abstract definition of a filter. In particular, for every probability space, the set of all
probability-one events is a filter, in every topological space, the set of all co-meager subsets
is a filter, and, in the set of natural numbers, the collection of all co-finite subsets is a filter.
Before going ahead and applying this notion for our purposes, let us recall its precise
definition. For more on filters and their applications in classical logic see [2].
Definition 3.1 (Filter). Given a set U , a collection of its subsets, Γ , is a filter over U iff it
satisfies the following conditions:
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• Non-emptiness. Γ 6= ∅.
• Intersection. If A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ then A∩B ∈ Γ .
• Monotonicity. If A ∈ Γ and A⊂ B then B ∈ Γ .
Our semantics associates a filter, over the set of worlds of the model, with every world w
and every sentence α. To determine whether ‘α normally implies β’ holds in w, one checks
whether the set of worlds satisfying β is a member of the filter associate with w and the
set of worlds satisfying α. As a set A may have many different filters defined over it, our
models allow the flexibility of choosing different filters for different worlds. This enables
the reflection of various realistic considerations in the formation of default knowledge
bases. For example, at one world a filter may be picked so as to represent subsets of worlds
that it “sees”, another world may give higher ‘weight’ to subsets of the worlds which are
closest to it in time or in space, etc. In the sequel we will see how other systems that commit
to a more specific criteria for distinguishing between worlds (e.g., Pearl’s System Z [20])
can be embedded in our framework. We can now define the models formally:
Definition 3.2 (Filter-based model). Given a set of propositional variables, V . A filter-
based model (FBM) consists of three components: U , φ, and N , such that the following
holds:
(1) U is an arbitrary set. U is called the universe and elements of U are called worlds.
(2) φ :U 7→ 2V is a labelling function, associating with every world in the universe the
set of propositional variables that hold in that world.
(3) N is a function, assigning to everyw ∈ U and to every A⊂ U , a set of subsets of U ,
denoted Nw(A), such that A ∈Nw(A) and Nw(A) is a filter over U .
Note that sinceA ∈Nw(A), the subset {A∩B: B ∈Nw(A)} ofNw(A) is a filter overA.
To define the truth value function in such models we would like to use the following
notation:
Notation. Given a filter-based model,M = 〈U, φ,N 〉, and formula α, letM |=w α denote
that α holds in w. Let us also denote the set of all worlds (in U ) in which α holds by ‖α‖.
Definition 3.3 (Semantics). Given a model, M = 〈U, φ,N 〉, a world w in U and a
sentence, α, in the language of DML, the truth value of α in w is defined inductively
as follows:
• If α ∈ V then M |=w α iff α ∈ φ(w).
• The propositional connectives are interpreted as usual. For example, M |=w ¬α iff
M 6|=w α, M |=w α ∧ β iff M |=w α and M |=w β , etc.
• M |=w α 2−→ β iff ‖β‖ ∈Nw(‖α‖).
Note that defaults can vary between worlds, or in other words, that we allow for
“subjective” defaults: it might be the case that in the same model, a default implication,
α
2−→ β , holds in one world, and fails in another.
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There is one technical point that we would like to mention briefly. Looking at the above
definition, one may notice that, for the purposes of defining a semantics, among all subsets
of U only those of the form ‖α‖ play a role. Such sets are called definable sets and they
are usually only a negligible minority (cardinality-wise) of the set of all subsets of U . The
theory of filters allows the restriction of the definition to such sub-collections of sets (such
collections, being closed under Boolean set operations, are called Boolean algebras). We
shall take advantage of this flexibility and assume that all the subsets of a universe U that
we care about are definable (i.e., of the form ‖α‖ for some α in the language).
3.2. The basic proof system
We now turn to the discussion of various proof systems for DML. We shall show that
our basic semantics can be modulated to match a wide range of such systems.
We begin by introducing the logical system that seems to reflect the basic properties of
a notion of implication. In particular, this proof system, denoted by F, is (strictly) weaker
than the weakest system offered by [12] for a notion of default implication. It turns out that
the system F is sound and complete with respect to the class of all FBMs.
Definition 3.4 (The logical system F).
Axioms:
• Classical. All instances of tautologies of propositional logic.
• Reflexivity. α 2−→ α.
Inference rules:
• Modus Ponens (MP).
α→ β, α
β
.
• Left Logical Equivalence (LLE).
α↔ β, α 2−→ γ
β
2−→ γ .
• Right Weakening (RW).
γ
2−→ α, α→ β
γ
2−→ β .
• And.
α
2−→ β, α 2−→ γ
α
2−→ β ∧ γ .
Proposition 3.5. The system F (as well as any of its extensions discussed in this paper) is
consistent.
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Proof. Let L be a DML language. For every sentence α in L let α be a sentence in
propositional logic obtained by replacing each 2−→ in α by →. Consistency follows by
noting that for every α ∈ L, `F α implies that α is a tautology. 2
Theorem 3.6. The logical system F is sound and complete for the family of filter-based
models.
In the theorem above and in all subsequent results on soundness and completeness of
some proof system Σ , we refer to soundness and completeness in the extended sense, that
is, soundness and completeness means that for every theory T and a sentence α, T `Σ α
iff for every model and for every world w in the model, if M |=w T then M |=w α.
3.3. A hierarchy of implication relations
In this section we list several inference rules that have been suggested in the literature
(see, for example, [12]) as properties that a default implication may be required to comply
with. We match up each of these rules with a corresponding set-theoretic requirement of
the class of FBMs. We prove characterization results that show that these correspondences
are tight.
While all the specifications of the neighborhood functionN , in the definition of general
FBMs, dealt with each collection Nw(A) on its own, the following requirements regulate
the connections between different filters associated with the same world (i.e., Nw(A) and
Nw(B) for any fixed w). In Section 5, when we discuss possible nesting rules, we will
have to impose requirements relating the Nw’s of different w’s.
The table in Fig. 1 displays some of these pairs—an inference rule and its associated
semantic requirement. The formulas in the semantic requirement column should be read as
universal, i.e, each rule demands that its formula holds for all w’s, A’s and B’s.
Inference rules Semantic requirements
Cut (α∧β)
2−→γ, α 2−→β
α
2−→γ UC If B ∈Nw(A)
then Nw(A∩B)⊆Nw(A)
CM α
2−→β, α 2−→γ
α∧β 2−→γ DC If B ∈Nw(A)
then Nw(A∩B)⊇Nw(A)
Or α
2−→γ, β 2−→γ
(α∨β) 2−→γ RBC (Nw(A)∩Nw(B))⊆Nw(A∪B)
Mon α
2−→γ
(α∧β) 2−→γ GTS (Nw(A)∩Nw(B))⊇Nw(A∪B)
Fig. 1. A list of inference rules and their corresponding constraints on models.
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The symbol UC in the table in Fig. 1, stands for upward continuity, DC stands for
downward continuity, RBC stands for reasoning by cases, GTS stands for general to
specific, and CM stands for cautious monotonicity. The last inference rule in the table,
Mon, is the monotonicity condition, the exact rule that any nonmonotonic implication
relation should violate. We bring it here just for completeness.
The first pair of conditions, UC and DC, concerns the relations between the filter
associated with some set A and the filter associated with a subset of it. If the subset is
of the form A∩B , for some B ∈Nw(A), then, as both A and B are members of this filter,
so is also the set A∩B . It follows that Nw(A) itself may serve as Nw(A∩B). Part (3) of
Theorem 3.7 below states that, to obtain a sound and complete semantics for the system
C, this should be the case. The conditions DC and UC are the relaxations of this demand
to one-sided containments. By parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 3.7, they correspond to the
inference rules Cut and CM, respectively.
The other pair of conditions, RBC and GTS, concerns the relations between the filters
over sets, A and B , with the filter over their union. As A ∪ B is a superset of both A
and B , this set is a member of both Nw(A) and Nw(B). It follows that the intersection of
these two filters may serve as the filter Nw(A∪B). Parts (4) and (5) of Theorem 3.7 show
that RBC and GTS—the one-sided containment relations between Nw(A) ∩Nw(B) and
Nw(A∪B)—correspond to the inference rules Or and Mon, respectively. One may note
in passing, that this correspondence underscores the fact that Or is exactly the rule Mon
reversed.
Makinson [15] defines a natural consequence relation induced by Reiter’s default logic
[21]. This relation satisfies all the axioms and inference rules of the system F+{Cut}, but it
does not satisfy Or and cautious monotonicity. 2 Item (1) of Theorem 3.7 below provides
a semantic characterization of such a proof system.
The system obtained by adding both Cut and CM to the system F is the system
Cumulative Reasoning, (C), introduced by Kraus et al. [12].
The strongest system for which Kraus et al. offer a characterizing semantics is the system
P—Preferential Reasoning—which consist of the system C+Or.
Theorem 3.7 (Soundness and completeness).
(1) The proof system F+Cut is sound and complete for the class of all FBMs satisfying
UC.
(2) The proof system F + CM is sound and complete for the class of all FBMs that
satisfy the downward continuity condition, DC.
(3) The proof system C is sound and complete for the class of all FBMs that satisfy both
the upward and the downward continuity conditions, i.e., models in which, for all
w,A,B , if B ∈Nw(A) then Nw(B ∩A)=Nw(A).
(4) The proof system P is sound and complete for the class of all FBMs that satisfy all
three conditions, UC, DC and RBC.
(5) The proof system F+Mon is sound and complete for the class of all FBMs satisfying
the GTS condition.
2 This observation challenges an argument by Kraus et al. [12, Section 3.1] that they “do not know anything
interesting” about systems that are weaker than the system C.
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4. Some general considerations leading to our semantics
Modal logic is a common tool for modeling default reasoning. In this section we prove
that filter-based models are the most general modal logic for that purpose. That is, any
modal semantics that satisfies the basic default rules can be presented, in a natural way, as
a filter-based semantics.
In several systems for default reasoning, defaults are modeled by a binary relation with
the intended meaning of default implication. 3 These systems include the preferential
logics of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [12], the conditional logics of Boutilier [4],
System Z of Pearl [20], and others (e.g., [25]). Each of these systems consider a “universe”
which is the set of all possible worlds, and they all enforce some type of preference, or
normality ordering on the universe. The default “if α then normally β” is then interpreted
as “In the most normal worlds where α is true, β is true”. It has been shown that these
systems are closely related [4,5,12,14].
Chellas [9, Chapter 10], [8] noted that systems for conditional logics can be viewed as
special cases of modal logic. This observation was carried on to logics for default reasoning
[4,10]. In this section we wish to analyze this phenomenon further and to show that our
semantics is, in some precise sense, the most general semantics for a ‘normally implies’
modal connective. To make the above statement carry some rigorous meaning, we begin
by introducing a very broad definition for the notion of a modal connective. We do not
attempt to struggle with the philosophical issues that may be involved with such a proposed
definition, we regard our definition as just a reasonable solution to the need for a formal
framework in which one may carry out our analysis.
We use the term ‘connective’ to denote a syntactic operator ∗( , . . . , ) generating (new)
formulas from n-tuples of (old) formulas in some formal language L.
Definition 4.1 (Modal semantics).
• A connective ∗(, . . . , ) has a modal semantics (or, allowing a minor abuse of
terminology, ‘is a modal connective’) if its semantics is defined as follows:
A model for the language is a set of ‘worlds’, U , in which each world has its
own ‘state of affairs’ or ‘point of view’. I.e., each world,w, assigns a truth value,
Vw(α), to every formula α, and, for every world w and formulas (α1, . . . , αn),
the truth value Vw(∗(α1, . . . , αn)), is a function of the truth values assigned to
the αi ’s by the worlds in U .
In other words, using the notation ‖α‖ for the set of all worlds that satisfy α, for every
w ∈ U and formulas, (α1, . . . , αn), the set (of worlds) ‖∗(α1, . . . , αn)‖ is a function
of the sets ‖α1‖, . . . ,‖αn‖.
• A modal structure, for a language with a connective ∗( , . . . , ), is a tuple
(U,F∗( , . . . , ), . . .), such that F∗ maps n-tuples of subsets of U to subsets
of U as above. I.e., for every (α1, . . . , αn) in the language, ‖∗(α1, . . . , αn)‖ =
F∗(‖α1‖, . . . ,‖αn‖).
3 This is to distinguish these systems from other systems where defaults are represented differently. For
example, in Reiter’s default logic [21], defaults are special kind of inference rules, in Moore’s autoepistemic
logic [16], defaults are expressed using a special unary belief operator.
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Note that under this definition the operators “If α then normally β” of [4,12,20] may all
be interpreted as modal operators.
For example, in the Cumulative Models of [12], a semantic structure is a triple (S, l,≺)
where S is a set of ‘states’, ≺ is some binary relation over S and l maps these states to sets
of ‘worlds’ in some universe set U . A statement “If α then normally β” holds in such a
structure iff in every state that all its worlds satisfy α, if this state is minimal with respect
to the relation ≺ then all its worlds satisfy β as well. If we use ∗(α,β) to denote such an
implication we get:
F∗(‖α‖,‖β‖)=

U if the above condition, relating the worlds
satisfying α and β, holds,
∅ otherwise.
As another example, in System Z [19], a semantic structure is a pair (U, κ) where U is
a set of worlds and κ is a ranking function assigning to each world a nonnegative integer.
A statement “If α then normally β” holds in such a structure if the minimum rank of a
world that satisfies α ∧ β is strictly lower than the minimum rank of a world that satisfies
α ∧¬β . If we use ∗(α,β) to denote such an implication we get that in System Z (take⇒
to be the default connective in System Z):
F⇒(‖α‖,‖β‖)=
{
U if min{κ(w): w |= α ∧ β}<min{κ(w): w |= α ∧¬β},
∅ otherwise.
Finally, in the plausibility measures approach of Friedman and Halpern [11], a
plausibility structure (for a language L) is a tuple PL = {U,F ,Pl,pi}, where (U,F ,Pl)
is a plausibility space, and pi maps each possible world to a truth assignment to the
formulas in L in a consistent way. The plausibility space (U,F ,Pl) is composed of U ,
a set of worlds, F , a set of subsets of U closed under union and complementation such that
{‖α‖: α ∈ L} ⊆ F , and Pl is a function mapping sets in F to elements in some arbitrary
partially ordered set having a lowest element ⊥ and highest element >. In addition to the
assumption that: Pl(U) = > and Pl(∅) =⊥, three other axioms are assumed (given a set
A, A is the complement of A): 4
A1. If A⊆ B then Pl(A)6 Pl(B).
A2′. For all sets A,B , and C, if Pl(A ∩B) > Pl(A∩B) and Pl(A∩C) > Pl(A∩C) then
Pl(A∩B ∩C) > Pl(A∩B ∩C).
A3. If Pl(A)= Pl(B)=⊥, then Pl(A∪B)=⊥.
According to the definition of Friedman and Halpern, PL |= α→ β iff either Pl(‖α‖)=⊥
or Pl(‖α ∧ β‖) > Pl(‖α ∧¬β‖). Hence we get that in plausibility structures:
F→(‖α‖,‖β‖)=
{
U if Pl(‖α‖)=⊥ or Pl(‖α ∧ β‖) > Pl(‖α ∧¬β‖),
∅ otherwise.
4 In [11] axiom A2′ is replaced by a different axiom which is equivalent to A2′ in the presence of A1.
S. Ben-David, R. Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 217–236 227
Note that the condition defining the truth value of this implication is indeed a function on
‖α‖ and ‖β‖.
It is also worthwhile to mention that, whenever the truth value of ∗(α,β) does not depend
upon a world w (as is the case in all the above mentioned semantic frameworks), the range
of the function F∗ is just {∅,U}. This makes the nesting of the ∗ connective trivial, that is,
you can easily find a method to translate every nested formula into a non-nested formula
that has the same truth value in a given structure.
Endowed with the above notation, one can naturally translate requirements for a
connective, ∗, to requirements on the function F∗ that it induces on the subsets of a modal
universe. In particular, one can easily see the correspondence between rules of the logical
system P (Section 3.3) and a binary modal operator, ∗(α,β). For example:
• Right Weakening (RW) rule translates into ‘For all α,β, γ , if ‖β‖ ⊆ ‖γ ‖ then
F∗(‖α‖,‖β‖)⊆ F∗(‖α‖,‖γ ‖)’.
• Reflexivity (Ref) translates into ‘For all α, F∗(‖α‖,‖α‖) = U ’.
When dealing with a binary operation, it is sometimes helpful to keep one variable fixed
and analyze the properties of the operator with respect to the other variable. Towards this
purpose, let us introduce one further notation.
Notation. For a binary modal connective ∗(α,β), and a model for this connective over a
universe U , let
Nw(α) def= {‖β‖: Vw(∗(α,β))= true}.
Note that Nw(α) is defined in a way parallel to the definition of the function N in the
definition of FBMs (Definition 3.2).
The following theorem states that indeed the models presented in this paper represent
the most general modal semantics that correspond to the various logical systems we have
considered. Note that the proof of this theorem is immediate from the definitions of the
notions involved (all the set-theoretic conditions relate to the Boolean algebra generated
by definable sets of worlds, that is, sets of the form ‖α‖ for some α ∈ L).
Theorem 4.2 (Generality). Let ∗( , ) be a binary modal connective, then:
(1) ∗ satisfies LE (as well as the analogous ‘Right Equivalence’).
(2) ∗ satisfies RW and AND iff, for every w ∈ U and every α ∈ L, Nw(α) is a filter (in
the Boolean algebra {‖α‖: α ∈L}).
(3) ∗ satisfies Ref iff for every w ∈ U and every α ∈ L, Nw(α) concentrates on ‖α‖
(i.e., ‖α‖ ∈Nw(α)).
(4) ∗ satisfies CUT and CM iff for every α and w, Nw(α) satisfies the coherence
condition.
(5) ∗ satisfies Or iff for every α and w, Nw(α) satisfies the RBC condition.
From a model-theoretic point of view, Theorem 4.2 is a definability result. It states that
the proof systems that we discuss actually define the classes of all models in which the
functionN has the corresponding property.
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The “soundness” claim of Theorem 4.2 can be applied to tailor semantics to fit any given
proof systems which is a subset of P. This may be done by translating the deduction rules
and axioms to requirements concerning the function F∗ and then finding a set-theoretic
operator that meets these demands. In Section 4.1 below we demonstrate this approach by
offering sound and complete semantics for some of the extensions of C that were proposed
by [12].
On the other hand, the generality claim of Theorem 4.2 offers a tool for proving the
non-existence of modal semantics with certain properties (by showing the non-existence
of FBMs having the characterizing set-theoretic properties).
The following example shows how part (3) of Theorem 4.2 applies to the plausibility
measures approach of Friedman and Halpern [11].
Example 4.3. Since system F of axioms is sound for plausibility structures, it follows
from Theorem 4.2 that the following claim is true:
Let PL = {U,F ,Pl,pi} be a plausibility structure for a language L. For every formula
α ∈L the set B = {‖β‖: PL |= α→ β} is a filter in the Boolean algebra {‖γ ‖: γ ∈L}.
We will provide a direct proof for this claim, by showing that for any formula α ∈ L, B
satisfies the three conditions of a filter. If Pl(‖α‖)=⊥ then B =F , and hence it is clearly
a filter in the above algebra. Assume that Pl(‖α‖) 6= ⊥.
• Non-emptiness. Since Pl(‖α‖) 6= ⊥, and Pl(‖α ∧ ¬α‖) = Pl(∅) =⊥, it follows that
Pl(‖α ∧ α‖) > Pl(‖α ∧¬α‖), and so α→ α, and hence ‖α‖ ∈ B.
• Intersection. Intersection follows from axiom A2′: suppose ‖β‖ ∈ B and ‖γ ‖ ∈ B. So
α→ β and α→ γ . Since Pl(α) 6= ⊥, Pl(‖α∧β‖) > Pl(‖α∧¬β‖) and Pl(‖α∧γ ‖) >
Pl(‖α ∧¬γ ‖). So by axiom A2′,
Pl(‖α ∧ β ∧ γ ‖) > Pl(‖α ∧¬(β ∧ γ )‖).
Hence α→ β ∧ γ , and so ‖β ∧ γ ‖ ∈ B.
• Monotonicity. Suppose ‖β‖ ∈ B. So α→ β , and hence:
Pl(‖α ∧ β‖) > Pl(‖α ∧¬β‖). (1)
Now, suppose that for some γ ∈ L‖β‖ ⊆ ‖γ ‖. Hence ‖α ∧ ¬γ ‖ ⊆ ‖α ∧ ¬β‖
and ‖α ∧ β‖ ⊆ ‖α ∧ γ ‖. So by axiom A1, Pl(‖α ∧ ¬γ ‖) 6 Pl(‖α ∧ ¬β‖) and
Pl(‖α ∧ β‖) 6 Pl(‖α ∧ γ ‖). It follows from (1) that Pl(‖α ∧ γ ‖) > Pl(‖α ∧ ¬γ ‖),
and hence α→ γ . So ‖γ ‖ ∈ B.
As a last application, let us use Theorem 4.2 to prove a generality-type result concerning
the semantics of selection functions. Selection functions are one of the known possible
world semantics for conditional logics (see [18] for a survey). A selection function f
assigns to a sentence α and a world w a set of worlds f (α,w). A conditional ∗(α,β)
holds at a world w just in case β is true in every world in f (α,w).
Theorem 4.4. Any finite modal structure for a binary connective, say ∗( , ), that is sound
for the system F, is world-wise equivalent to a model in the selection functions semantics. 5
5 Two modal structures (over the same universe) are world-wise equivalent iff for every α and w, α holds in w
in one modal structure iff it holds in w in the other modal structure.
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The proof is very simple: We already know from Theorem 4.2, that in any such
semantics, for every world w, and every formula α, {‖β‖: Vw(∗(α,β)) = T } is a filter
(over U ). Now, recall a basic fact from the theory of filters, namely that every filter over a
finite set, U , is of the form {B: B ⊇D}, for some D ⊆ U (such filters are called principal
filters). Our claim is now established by noticing that, whenever this filter is principal
then the FBM semantics is equivalent to the ‘accessibility relation’ semantics obtained by
viewing the generating set, D, of this filter, as the set of worlds f (α,w) defining the truth
value of ∗(α,β) in the selection function semantics.
4.1. Modal semantics beyond preferential reasoning
We will now demonstrate how the approach of this section can be applied to provide
simple semantics for several other logical systems for default reasoning. The logical
systems that we will consider are the ones obtained by adding to the system P, one by
one, the rules of Negation Rationality, Disjunctive Rationality and Rational Monotonicity,
that were introduced in [12]. As these rules are of strictly increasing power they give rise to
three proof systems. For each of these systems we shall present a matching ‘general modal
semantics’. I.e., a semantics in terms of a function F∗ as described above. On top of being
sound and complete for their respective systems, our semantics are also ‘most general’ for
these systems in the sense of Theorem 4.2 above.
Negation Rationality (NR) is the rule
¬(α ∧ γ 2−→ β),¬(α ∧¬γ 2−→ β)
¬(α 2−→ β) ,
Disjunctive Rationality (DR) is the rule
¬(α 2−→ β),¬(γ 2−→ β)
¬(α ∨ γ 2−→ β) ,
and Rational Monotonicity (RM) is the rule
¬(α ∧ γ 2−→ β),¬(α 2−→¬γ )
¬(α 2−→ β) .
When translated into the language of the function F∗ these rules become:
F-NR. F 2−→(A,B)⊆ F 2−→(A∩C,B) ∪ F 2−→(A \C,B).
F-DR. F 2−→(A∪C,B)⊆ F 2−→(A,B)∪ F 2−→(C,B).
F-RM. F 2−→(A,B)⊆ F 2−→(A∩C,B)∪ F 2−→(A, C¯).
Using the above constraints on the operator F∗, we can present three families of models
that characterize the systems obtained by augmenting P by any of the above rules. The
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following pair of theorems extend the completeness theorems of the previous section and
the generality (or, definability) theorem of the previous subsection.
Theorem 4.5 (Soundness and completeness).
• The class of all FBMs obeying F-NR is sound and complete for the proof system
F+NR.
• The class of all FBMs obeying F-DR is sound and complete for the proof system
F+DR.
• The class of all FBMs obeying F-RM is sound and complete for the proof system
F+RM.
One should note that the above results readily extends to any of the systems discussed
so far. I.e., if a class of FBMs, K , is sound and complete for some proof system, Pr,
extending F, then the class of all structures in K that meet the F-NR requirement is sound
and complete for the system Pr+NR.
Theorem 4.6 (Generality).
• A modal structure for a binary connective 2−→ satisfies NR iff its underlying function
F 2−→ satisfies F-NR.
• A modal structure for a binary connective 2−→ satisfies DR iff its underlying function
F 2−→ satisfies F-DR.
• A modal structure for a binary connective 2−→ satisfies RM iff its underlying function
F 2−→ satisfies F-RM.
Lehmann and Magidor [14] have advocated the class of “ranked models” as a class that
characterizes the logical system P∪ {RM}, and have discussed the relative strength of the
axioms NR, DR, and RM. Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 provides an alternative, modular and
simple semantics for the system P∪ {RM}, and a novel tool by which the relative strength
of the axioms can be analyzed.
5. Nesting of defaults
One of the interesting features of our system is that it allows us to express nested
defaults. For example, the following interesting axioms can be expressed in our logic:
Default Implication (DI). (α 2−→ β) 2−→ (α→ β).
Default Contraposition (DC). (α 2−→ β) 2−→ (¬β 2−→¬α).
Left Associativity (LA). ((α 2−→ β) 2−→ γ )→ (α 2−→ (β 2−→ γ )).
DI states that if a default holds then normally its material implication counterpart holds.
DC states that if a default holds, then normally its contraposition holds. For example, it
supports the assertion “if a criminal normally comes from a low socioeconomic class,
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then normally people who come from a high socioeconomic classes are not criminals”. In
general, these axioms are not satisfied by PFBMs, and we can show that none of them is
implied by the others.
A philosophical debate whether the above axioms are appropriate is out of the scope
of this paper. We will just show that by adding more constraints on the relation N in the
PFBMs we can accommodate these axioms as well, once one decides that they are suitable.
The axiom DI translates to the condition F 2−→(F 2−→(‖α‖,‖β‖),‖¬α‖ ∪ ‖β‖)= U .
The axiom DC translates to the condition
F 2−→(F 2−→(‖α‖,‖β‖),F 2−→(‖¬β‖,‖¬α‖))= U .
We can prove the appropriate characterization and generalization theorems for these
axioms as well.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the logic DML which is obtained by introducing a
binary modal operator with the intended meaning of default implication. We have defined
a general notion of a modal connective and shown that any system in which the default
connective is defined as a modal connective is a special case of our logic. In particular,
logics for default reasoning, (e.g., [4,12,20]) may be viewed as subsystems of DML.
Our logic has several desirable features: first, it allows full nesting of the default operator,
hence providing modal logic-based semantics for nested defaults. Second, it allows us to
represent local, or, subjective, defaults: each world within the same model may have its
own defaults which might differ from and relate to other worlds’ defaults. Third, while
other default logics build their models using a notion of normal worlds, a property which
depends on the contents of the worlds (i.e., the truth values of the propositions in the
worlds) and determined by some initial knowledge whose origins are vague, we replace
the notion of normal worlds by the concept of majority: each world is given “large” sets of
worlds according to which we decide which defaults hold in the world. We do not need to
know the content of the worlds in order to build a model to reason with. Fourth, we have
shown that our logic is modular—it is relatively easy to strengthen the logical system and
find characterizing models for the new systems. In all the default logics mentioned above,
most of the above four virtues are missing.
Structures which are similar to filter-based models were used by Chellas [8] to provide
appropriate semantics for some weak system of conditional logic. We show here that
Chellas’ approach can be adapted very naturally to give intuitive modular semantics for
logics for default reasoning, and prove that the semantics we propose is in a very precise
sense most general.
7. Proofs of the completeness theorems
First, let us recall some basic definitions and propositions of proof theory (for a
reference, see, for example, [7]).
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Definition 7.1 (Consistent theory). A theory T is consistent with respect to some proof
system Σ iff there is no sentence α such that T `Σ α and T `Σ ¬α.
Definition 7.2 (Complete theory). A theory T is complete iff for every sentence α either
α ∈ T or ¬α ∈ T . Note that, if T is a complete theory then, for every α, α ∈ T iff T ` α.
Proposition 7.3.
(1) If T is a consistent theory then there is a theory T ′ ⊇ T such T ′ is complete and
consistent.
(2) If T is a consistent theory, then T ∪ {a} is consistent iff T 0¬α.
It is straightforward to see that, as all the formal theories we discuss contain
propositional logic and all their formal proofs are finite, the standard proofs of the above
proposition are valid in all the modal logics here.
Corollary 7.4. If T is a consistent theory and T 0 a then there is a complete and
consistent theory T ′ such that T ∪ {¬a} ⊆ T ′.
We now turn to the proofs of theorems in this paper. Let us fix a DML language L.
Proposition 7.5. The following inference rule is a derived rule of the system F:
α
2−→ β,α ∧ β→ γ
α
2−→ γ . (2)
Proof. Here is a formal derivation of α 2−→ γ from the assumptions α 2−→ β and
α ∧ β→ γ :
α
2−→ β (assumption)
α
2−→ α (Reflexivity)
α
2−→ α,α 2−→ β
α
2−→ α ∧ β (AND)
α ∧ β→ γ (assumption)
α
2−→ α ∧ β,α ∧ β→ γ
α
2−→ γ (Right Weakening) 2
Definition 7.6 (Filter closure). Given a set of sets A over a domain U , the filter closure
of A (with respect to U ) (notation: cl(A)) is the minimal family of subsets of U that
containsA and is closed under intersection and supersets.
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The canonical model, defined below, plays a central role in most of the proofs:
Definition 7.7 (Canonical model). Given a proof systemΣ and a theory S, the canonical
model MΣ,S = 〈U, φ,N 〉 is defined as follows:
• Universe. U is the set of all consistent and complete theories (with respect to Σ) that
extend S.
Notation: For every sentence α, let [α] denote {T ∈ U : α ∈ T }.
• Labeling function. φ maps each T in U to the set of all atoms that belong to T .
• Filters. For every T in U and every sentence α, NT ([α])= clU ({[β] :α 2−→ β ∈ T }).
Proposition 7.8. IfΣ includes the reflexivity axiom then for any theory T MΣ,S is a filter-
based model.
Proof. The definition of clU (A) guarantees that, for everyA⊆ U , clU (A) is a filter over U .
It remains to verify that, for every T and every α, ‖α‖ ∈NT (‖α‖). The reflexivity axiom
readily implies that [α] ∈ NT ([α]). Lemma 7.12 below shows that [α] = ‖α‖, for every
α. 2
Lemma 7.9. In the canonical model MΣ,S , for every two sentences α and β , [α] ⊆ [β] iff
S `Σ α→ β .
Proof. Suppose S 0 α → β . Then S ∪ {¬(α → β)} is consistent, so there must be a
consistent and complete theory T that extends S ∪ {¬(α→ β)}. Since ¬(α → β) ↔
α∧¬β is a tautology, it must be the case that T contains both α and ¬β—a contradiction.
The other direction is trivial. 2
Corollary 7.10. The function N in Definition 7.7 is well defined. That is, for every
formulas α and β and every T ∈ U , if [α] = [β] then NT ([α])=NT ([β]).
Lemma 7.11. Suppose M is a canonical model with respect to some proof system Σ and
some theory S. Then for every T ∈ U and for every two sentences α and β , [β] ∈NT ([α])
iff α 2−→ β ∈ T .
Proof. One direction follows from the definition of N . For the other direction, Suppose
[β] ∈NT ([α]). So it must be the case that for some k and some sentences
δ1, . . . , δk, α
2−→ δi ∈ T
for every 16 i 6 k and
[β] ⊇
[
k∧
i=1
δi
]
.
By Lemma 7.9, S `Σ α∧ δ1∧· · ·∧ δk→ β , and since S ⊆ T , T `Σ α∧ δ1∧· · ·∧ δk→ β .
By the inference rule And,
T `Σ α 2−→ δ1 ∧ · · · ∧ δk,
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so by the inference rule (2) above,
T `Σ α 2−→ β.
Since T is complete α 2−→ β ∈ T . 2
From now on we assume that all proof systems extend F.
Lemma 7.12 (Basic Lemma). Let M be a canonical model for some proof system Σ and
some theory S. Then [α] = ‖α‖, for every sentence α. In other words, for every T ∈ U and
every sentence α, M |=T α iff α ∈ T .
Proof. By induction on α.
• α is an atom: the claim follows from the definition of M .
• α is ¬β or β ∨ γ : the claim follows from consistency and completeness of T .
• α is β 2−→ γ : if β 2−→ γ ∈ T then, by our definition of the filters, [γ ] ∈NT ([β]). By
the induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to ‖γ ‖ ∈NT (‖β‖), which by the definition
of the semantics implies that M |=T β 2−→ γ .
Suppose now that M |=T β 2−→ γ . By the definition of the semantics, ‖γ ‖ ∈
NT (‖β‖), invoking the induction hypothesis, we get [γ ] ∈NT ([β]). By Lemma 7.11,
this implies that β 2−→ γ ∈ T . 2
Corollary 7.13. The proof system F is sound and complete for the family of filter-based
models.
Proof. The soundness part is easy to verify. The completeness follows from the above
lemma by a standard argument; let S be a theory in our modal language and α a sentence.
Assume that S 6`F α. By Proposition 7.3, there’s a complete and consistent theory T so that
S ∪ {¬α} ⊆ T . Going to the canonical model M =MF,∅, we get M |=T S ∪ {¬α}. As M
is a filter-based model, S 6|= α with respect to filter-based models. 2
Consider now the table in Fig. 1. By the above argument, in order to prove the
completeness Theorem 3.7, all we have to show is that, if Σ includes the inference rule
on the left-hand side of the table then the canonical model must obey the corresponding
semantic requirement listed on the right-hand side. As was justified before, we assume that
the sets A and B in Fig. 1 are definable sets.
Cut. Suppose Σ includes Cut. We have to show that for every T ∈ U and for every
A,B ⊆ U MΣ,S satisfies UC. Assume without loss of generality that A = ‖α‖ and
B = ‖β|, for some α and β . Suppose that for some T , ‖β‖ ∈NT (‖α‖), and that for some
γ , ‖γ ‖ ∈ NT (‖α ∧ β|). So by Lemma 7.11 and Lemma 7.12, it must be the case that
α
2−→ β and α ∧ β 2−→ γ are in T . By Cut, it must be the case that α 2−→ γ ∈ T , and so
by Lemma 7.12 the definition of the filters in the canonical model, ‖γ ‖ ∈NT (‖α‖).
The proof of the cases CM, Or and Mon are similar and straightforward.
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Theorem 4.5 is proved in a similar way to the proof of Theorem 3.7. The soundness part
is immediate. The completeness part is pretty straightforward as well. For example, we’ll
show that if Σ includes NR then the condition F-NR must hold in the canonical model.
So suppose that for some theory T we have α 2−→ β ∈ T (that is, we take A= ‖α‖ and
B = ‖β‖). We have to show that for every γ , either α∧γ 2−→ β ∈ T or α∧¬γ 2−→ β ∈ T .
Assume, by way of contradiction, that none of them is in T . Then, since T is complete,
it must be the case that ¬(α ∧ γ 2−→ β) ∈ T and ¬(α ∧ ¬γ 2−→ β) ∈ T . By NR then, it
follows that ¬(α 2−→ β) ∈ T , a contradiction to the assumption that T is consistent.
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